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Abstract
This article analyzes the political language of the Russian Orthodox Church as a social
/ public instrument of influence. Against the backdrop of post-secular processes, it
considers the specifics of the language of political church strategies that go beyond the
traditional religious domain. The ways and communicative approaches in the field of
government relations and public relations are shown, by which the Russian Orthodox
Church establishes relations with the authorities in the post-Soviet period, and already
today demonstrates itself not just as one of the institutions of civil society, but also
as an institution vested with political functions and political authority. To construct its
social and political role, the Church acts situationally. On the one hand, it resorts to
narratives of the 20th century, using different discourses - from the “victim” one to
isolationism, on the other – to modern concepts typical for post-Soviet times, such as,
for example, the idea of messianism, “Katekhon,” that is, saving the world from sin.
In one way or another, the Church acts as an open political player, in part as a political
technologist offering recipes of “soft power” for strategic state purposes, especially
foreign policy objectives. The authors analyze the evolution of public rhetoric of the
Church leaders in the context of the post-secular institutionalization of Orthodoxy in
the space of politics and law.
Keywords: post-secularism, political language, post-Soviet, Orthodoxy, Russian
Orthodox Church, discourse of victimization, messianism, Orthodox civilization
1. Monarchism as a Sign of Church Inquiry for
Political System
The attitude for political influence has existed in Church from the very beginning of the
1990s, when Orthodoxywas prominent, as we can judge by the activism of monarchist
movements, their grass-roots support, and the demand in the political environment.
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The popularity of these movements was expressed in particular by the views of Ortho-
dox believers in the political sector, including the request for canonization of Nikolas
II, for a monarchy as the most favorable regime.
The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church stipulates in the
section ”Church and State” that ”The Orthodox tradition has developed an explicit
ideal of church-state relations,” namely ”church and state symphony”, which ”could
emerge in history only in a state that recognizes the Orthodox Church as the greatest
people’s shrine, in other words, only in an Orthodox state.” (§ III.4). According to the
Social Concept, ”The state in such symphonic relationships with the Church seeks her
spiritual support, prayer for itself and blessing upon its work to achieve the goal of its
citizens’ welfare, while the Church enjoys support from the state in creating conditions
favourable for preaching and for the spiritual care of her children who are at the same
time citizens of the state.”
In the same document, there is a positive quotation of the Determination of the
Local Council 1917 – 1918 on the legal status of Russian Orthodox Church: «The decrees
and statutes issued the Orthodox Church for herself in the order established by herself,
as well as deeds of the church government and court shall be recognized by the State
as legally binding and relevant. These words show that Church is interested to have a
state with not only protectionist policy towards the Church, but that receiving its (her)
laws and regulations of many social relations alongside with the very state laws and
regulations.” (§ III.4). The quotes above show the interest of the Church in a supportive
and Orthodox-based political system.
It must be borne in mind that at the time of the adoption of the Social Concept,
there was no such interest in the archaic as we observe today, and the Church tried
to make allowance for that, therefore, at the official level and at the Church senior
establishment level it tried to deny any claims to create a political system (On political
parties 2001 Federal law N 95-FZ). If they happened to speak about the monarchy
as the most favorable political system, they did it without any reference to political
realities, but in an abstract manner. But nevertheless, in some disguised manner, the
sympathy for the monarchy is still perceivable in the text of the Social Concept of the
ROC, although it has its own peculiarities and conditions for the exercise of power: ”Any
change in the form of government to that more religiously rooted, introduced without
spiritualising society itself, will inevitably degenerate into falsehood and hypocrisy and
make this form weak and valueless in the eyes of the people. However, one cannot
altogether exclude the possibility of such a spiritual revival of society as to make
natural a religiously higher form of government. (§ III.7). In particular, Bishop Tikhon
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of Egorievsk, Chairman of the Patriarchal Cultural Council, also refers to unfavourable
circumstances of the present: ”Themonarchy is the ideal condition, which is natural for
Russia. The monarchy is natural to us, but I think it is totally wrong to speak about the
renaissance of monarchy now,...one must elevate oneself and live through until the
special monarchic consciousness emerges. We are, of course, totally in no condition
at this time. Therefore, all the talk about the renaissance of monarchy now seems
completely vain... And democracy is what we need in our poverty [25].”
One should see a certain evolution in the Church’s political strategy. During the first
10 years of the 1990s, the Church tries simply to establish more or less constructive
contact with power by organizing from time to time the signing of various kinds of
treaties and agreements between the Ministry of Health, the Armed Forces, the Social
Ministry to get the opportunity of spiritual care and supervision within the framework
of the ministerial departments of these ministries.
2. Orthodox Civilization as a Missionary Project
During the millennium, when a certain period of restoration of church life passed, the
church began integrating into basic activity, which was the establishment of church
and parish life, the public mission. It began to offer society its paradigms of social and
moral life, based on Orthodoxy.
We can see the basic documents that were adopted by the Russian Orthodox Church.
This is the ”Basics of the social concept of the Russian Orthodox Church”, “The Russian
Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights” (Church’s
Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights 2008), “Declaration on Human
Rights and Dignity” (Declaration on Human Rights and Dignity 2006). Many documents
were adopted by such a body as the World Russian People’s Council, which is both a
church and a public body. The chairman and organizer of this cathedral is the current
Patriarch, who in 1993, then Metropolitan Kirill, initiated such a public platform on
which socially significant and politically significant ideas would be spoken out. During
the Council’s work, several documents were adopted such as “Code of Moral Manage-
ment Rules”, “Wealth and Poverty: Historical Challenges of Russia”, (XI WRPC), “Russia
and the West: a dialogue of peoples in search of answers to civilizational challenges”
(XX WRPC), “Russia and the Orthodox world” (VIII WRPC).
That is, as we see, the subjects are quite diverse, and it’s not so much an internal
church as the public agenda. Often it goes beyond the domestic framework. It should
be noted that on the foreign policy front, the church placed a special emphasis on
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foreign policy, which was devoted to the World Russian People’s Council, dedicated
to the theme ”Russia and the Orthodox World” in 2004. The project of ”Orthodox
Civilization” was announced there, as well as an explanation of what the Orthodox
world is and what it means for Russia (Orthodox Civilization). These issues should be
considered in more detail.
Metropolitan Kirill claimed that “The socio-political body of the Orthodoxworld com-
prises the states of the Orthodox tradition, the formation of cultures of which Ortho-
doxy had a decisive influence. These are Bulgaria, Belarus, Greece, Cyprus, Moldova,
the Republic ofMacedonia, Russia, Romania, Serbia andMontenegro, Ukraine. Also, the
Orthodox world includes peoples who constitute a religious minority in the countries of
residence, but are stable cultural and ethnic entities. These include parts of American,
Arab, Albanian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Finnish and other peoples. Finally, a new and very
dynamic element are the diasporas of Orthodox peoples, usually living in countries of
the Western tradition”, - Patriarch Kirill notes [8].”
In other words, the Church has proposed a civilizational doctrine, using the tools
of the Huntingtonian concept of ”Clash of Civilizations”, according to which several
civilizations stand out, most of which being associated with religious cultures at a cer-
tain depth level as a kind of matrix that sets ethical-behavioral preferences, attitudes,
sociocultural patterns.Huntington singles out Sino, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western,
Latin American civilizations (ibid). He also mentions the Orthodox civilization, which
indicates that Orthodoxy is something more than just a religion, and serves as a basis
for a specific socio-cultural way of life.
3. “VIP-mission”. Mechanisms and Features of
Church Political Language
To build its social and political mission and realize such a grandiose task as the construc-
tion of an ”Orthodox civilization,” the Church uses quite different strategic and tactical
methods. Let’s talk about them separately. One of them we call ‘VIP-mission’. Almost
from the very beginning of post-Soviet religious freedom, while lacking of means for
influencing political life directly, the Church began to establish interaction with the
authorities behind the scenes. The main strategic object of her mission was the state,
political and economic establishment. The Church began to dedicate her sermon to
officials, the government apparatus. It can be called VIP-mission. Metropolitan Kirill
pursued this strategy without unnecessary public declarations. In the Department of
External Church Relations during the time of his leadership, Kirill (Gundyaev, still in the
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office of the Metropolitan) compiled lists containing as much detailed information as
possible about every official, every person who occupies a position in the government
so as not to bypass with “missionary attention”, to congratulate every year with a
birthday, New Year or any significant date.
When Kirill (Gundyaev) became a Patriarch, he started pursuing this strategy in
a more open manner. In his meetings with the clergy in the dioceses, Kirill repeat-
edly urged the priests to pay special pastoral attention to the local elite, directors
of enterprises, production workers, and businessmen, with a view of obtainian their
administrative or financial support [10].
As part of this imperative, there is also a system of church awards and orders that
are distributed for diplomatic considerations. There is an obvious desire to influence
the government apparatus in order to gain its sympathies, and therefore support, to
continue pursuing own policy using power, administrative levers.
This phenomenon of gift is described in detail by the American psychologist Robert
Cialdini, who calls it a “reciprocation rule”, which is part of socialization and the rule
of many cultures. “A small initial favor can produce a sense of obligation to agree to a
substantially larger return favor,” Cialdini notes and continues:
“The reciprocation rule often makes people obey the demands of others.
The gist of one of the favorite ”lucrative” tactics of a certain kind of “com-
pliance professionals” is to give something to a person before asking him for
a reciprocal favor. This tactic is very effective due to the three aspects of the
reciprocation rule. First, this rule is universal, its influence often exceeds the
influence of other factors, which usually determine compliance. Secondly,
this rule comes into force even when we are given favors that we did not
ask for. Thus, our ability to make independent decisions decreases and the
choices are made from us by those to whom we owe something. Finally,
the rule of reciprocation can lead to unequal exchange. To get rid of an
unpleasant sense of moral obligation, people often agree to do amuchmore
serious favor than the one provided to them. [2]”
Cialdini calls the said practice ”the most powerful tool of influence of people on each
other” (ibid). Given the rootedness and normality of these schemes in society, one can
assume that the actions of the ROC are justified and its strategy well-thought [26]. It
is no accident, even at the legislative level of Russia, the mechanism of accepting gifts
by civil servants is being regulated (On Counteracting Corruption 2008 Federal Law
Clause 7 part 3 of Art. 12.1 No. 273-FZ of December 25).
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The missionary VIP strategy of the Moscow Patriarchate started bringing qualita-
tively more tangible fruit in the 2000s, when Vladimir Putin, appointed at the head of
the Russian government, related his political image to Orthodoxy through participation
in festive divine services in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior and gave privileges
to the Church establishment (which did not reflect positively on the actual situation
of ordinary believers). In particular, the Patriarch’s status was upgraded to a person
of federal significance being served by the Federal Security Service ([16], p. 50). A
certain ”fashion for Orthodoxy” emerged amidst the significant part of high-ranking
officials. It was in the first half of the 2000s that the custom of celebrating Orthodox
holidays, plunge into the ice-cold water on the Epiphany spread among high-ranking
people, the press was full of reports that officials observe fasts, and the Kremlin dining
room offered a special fast menu [15]. A certain subculture was formed, which can be
designated by the words ”pro-church nomenclature” - Orthodox or orthodox-oriented
officials and politicians ([16], p. 56).
4. Church as a Political Technologist
The Church, however, is entering into a qualitatively new phase of building a rela-
tionship with power aimed at active participation the law-making, showing itself as a
political player who knows the methods of the political game, and finally, the Church
begins to offer the state itself as a political technologist capable of solving problems
both in domestic and foreign policy. In the domestic politics, the Church is increasingly
talking about the importance of reliance on traditional conservative values, in one
joint commission of representatives of the church and the State Duma, it was even
suggested to compile a set of “basic values” on which one could build an ideology of
state and society ([23]; [16], p. 53).
As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Church offers here the services of political
technology in line with geopolitical objectives. The specificity of the Moscow Patri-
archate’s implementation of the political language, oriented at foreign policy, is very
clearly presented in the article by Elena Zhosul titled ”Realpolitik of Patriarch Kirill”,
published in the magazine Expert in 2011. It states:
“The travels of Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All as the first hierarch outside
the Moscow Diocese that he carried out as the first hierarch during the first
eight months of service, may offer new perspectives in the analysis of the
situation in the former Soviet republics.” In these travels, oversaturated in
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themeaningful, semantic terms, the vector of the foreign activity of the Rus-
sian Church and its new model of geopolitical strategy it develops is clearly
crystallized. This model should be carefully studied by the secular political
technology community, first of all by experts in Russia’s near-foreign policy,
as well as by those who identify themselves as political technology class,
but would like to place political technologies on a solid foundation of the
value basis. [27]”
There’s another peculiar quote next:
”A separate vector for the external work of the Moscow Patriarchate is
the opening of new temples and the organization of parishes for Russian
communities in the far abroad.” Be it the premises of embassies, diplomatic
and consulates, former Catholic or Lutheran churches, empty because of
impoverishment of their congregations, or the new church buildings that are
purposefully built, usually with the support of local authorities, the Russian
Church ”entangles” the entire planet with its own communication network,
making all the new ”watch tower” parishes in different locations. The more
”watch towers” there are, as we know, the better the connection is, the
more clearly the Russian Orthodox culture is captured in that state. (ibid)”
The article was intended to draw the attention of the political establishment to the
Russian Orthodox Church as a political force. And we see that the Church, through its
representative, does not renounce the language of political technology, but instead is
ready to use it, playing in the field of political technologists. Professional PR managers
of the ROC (remember that Elena Zhosul led the PR Department of the ROU) apply
clichés and patterns that are specific to the political sector.
I would note that the quotes given are well within the scope of the concept of
”political orthodoxy”. Its ideologist, Egor Kholmogorov, speaks of this in a similar tech-
nological context in an article published in a special collection of ”Political Orthodoxy.”
He writes that the opening of new temples and parishes should become ”an infras-
tructure of salvation” and even introduces the term ”urban lifestyle of the Orthodox
Church”, which is understood to mean the religious transformation of the entire social
organization:
“Sacred ’reindustrialization’ should be one of the most important points
of the political orthodoxy programme, with the anticipated construction
of churches and monasteries, the expansion of orthodox education pro-
grammes, the formation of Byzantine models, a distinctive urban Orthodox
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lifestyle, which is a fundamentally new task for Russia, since, in the age
of blossoming of Orthodox, Rus was a predominantly agrarian country. The
formula for the marginal development of the infrastructure of salvation
could be the principle that no locality in Russia shall have a point where the
domes of the church or the tent of the bell tower cannot be visible. ([6], p.
69-70)”
Unlike Zhosul, Kholmogorov discusses intense Orthodox transformations, not in for-
eign policy, but in the domestic politics, but his programme has the same intentions of
providing a meaningful Orthodox substrate. Moreover, Kholmogorov sees the temples
not only in the independent role of the center of spiritual life, but also as the instrumen-
tal, socio-political function to provide an effective arrangement for the organization of
Orthodox society and the state.
This way of integrating the church into political space is in line with the technique
used by Patriarch Kirill, who situationally changes the language of evangelical preach-
ing into the language of state benefit. The Church offers itself as a political agent and
in the field of population policy, directly recommending its influence and possibilities
for developing and implementing a plan for increasing the birth rate. Interestingly, the
Patriarch sometimes calls for an increase in the population not through articulating
Christian values, but through arguments inherent in secular politicians. For example, in
the quotations given below, he appeals to certain indicators such as population growth,
land development, the importance of labor - that is, to things considered as matters of
high national importance [13]. Speaking about the inadmissibility of abortion as a sin,
he analyzes the situation economically, socially and politically:
“The issue of demography in our country is increasingly worrying – both
amidst the specialists and the general public. Huge territories of Russia have
to be mastered, but there are not enough workers’ hands. (ibid)”
The patriarch shrewdly speaks about the reproduction of the population, about
demographic forecasting, mentioning the consequences of today’s reproductive pol-
icy.:
“And we know that the number of abortions is declining - in 2016 they were
made about 650 thousand … In order that you understand what is at stake,
just think: in a city like Tyumen, there are 744 thousand inhabitants. So, the
whole city was lost during a year! Over the past year, we lost a student
population of 650 schools on average, if we count a thousand people per
school! (ibid)”
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It seems that the ROC still likes to employ many of the mechanisms of ideologi-
cal influence peculiar to the Soviet period, it very actively employs Soviet patterns,
rhetoric techniques and arguments in its political language. Orthodox authors them-
selves distinguish as a component of the Soviet period such a feature of the Russian
church-parish culture as a commitment to declarations, slogan statements, a tendency
to set largely global tasks in the absence of attention to detail and individual small
steps. Just as in the Soviet times there were slogans like “Complete the five-year
plan in four years!” or “Economy should be economical”, today the Church calls for
humility and upholdingmoral values. But often nothing is said about how to implement
the tasks set in practice. This Soviet-style rhetoric is also used to condemn doctrines
that are alien to Orthodoxy and ideological systems. For example, the sharp rejection
of liberalism is disguised as a caricature, pejorative formulas inherent in the Soviet
language (“a creep of liberalism,” “a liberalism abscess,” “liberal Russophobia”).
Sometimes the Soviet military discourse is also borrowed from Soviet military songs.
For example, in 2012, when the Church entered into an obvious confrontation with
the Liberal Democrats associated with the rally on the Bolotnaya Square ”For Fair
Elections”, held on December 4, 2012, one of the church speakers - Fr Dmitry Smirnov
decided to paraphrase a well-known Soviet military song aimed at combating fascism,
where he styled a “swamp force” as an enemy, i.e., the liberal public that following the
rally on Bolotnaya, continued, along with politician Alexei Navalny, to support protests
against the current government.
The slogan compiled by Fr Dmitriy Smirnov unequivocally indicated with whom
exactly one had to “fight”andwho is to blame for the troubles of Russia and the Church:
“Arise, great country,
Get up to fight to the death!!
With the dark swamp force,
A hundred-spired horde”
Thus, the “people from Bolotnaya Square”, the opposition was identified with the
fascists who attacked the USSR in World War II.
5. European Liberalism as Heresy.
Politics in the Church-dogmatic Categories
Interesting statements are increasingly often made by representatives of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church, which deliberately emphasize her messianic, salvific role in the
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world, which is losing its Christian dimension. The main force that Orthodoxy must
oppose is the ideology of liberalism, which today dominates the West. The Patriarch
not simply characterizes it in eschatological tones as a destructive force that takesman
away from God and brings apocalypse closer, but most importantly, calls it “a global
heresy of man-worship [12]” That is, the conversation is translated into the plane
of ecclesiastical dogma. Accordingly, the Patriarch makes a completely “dogmatic”
conclusion: “we must defend Orthodoxy, as the fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical
Council defended it, as Patriarch Methodius and Empress Theodore defended it with a
host of hierarchs, as St. Mark of Ephesus and our confessors and new martyrs of the
Russian Church defended it. (ibid)”
It should be born in mind that translation the political dispute into a theological-
dogmatic plane, Patriarch Kirill gives it a qualitatively stronger, different purport. In
the eyes of those who are ready to recognize the dogmatic categories, liberalism and
Western civilization acquire literally demonic featuees that are inadmissible from the
point of view of the Orthodox consciousness. The confrontation of the modern ideol-
ogy of Western civilization, liberal-humanistic values and the principles of building a
modern European society is becoming a global messianic task of strategic importance.
In a recent interview with the Serbian writer Goran Lazovich, the Patriarch once again
formulates the struggle against the ”global heresy of human piety”:
“We, the Orthodox Serbs and Russians, are called, as previously, to stand
shoulder to shoulder in this battle for our spiritual identity, for preserving
the Orthodox civilization, defending the understanding of God-established
marriage as a union of man and woman, the value of human life from con-
ception to natural death, not succumbing to temptations of visible material
well-being and not being tempted by false ideas about human freedom and
happiness. [14]”
Similar methods of the ROC political language are manifested in the framework of
the participation of church representatives in international organizations, for example,
during the meeting in UNESCO in 2007 in the matter of affirming the conservative
understanding of human rights [9].
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6. “Sin” as a Factor of Justifying Coercing Institutions
This mechanism refers not so much to the internal positioning of the Church, but rather
to the external socio-political discourse inherent in the state in which the Church takes
part.
Here are a few quotes from the “Basics of the Social Concept” and explain why
we pay attention to it. “As secularization progressed, the high principles of inalienable
human rights turned into concepts of the individual’s rights outside his connection with
God. At the same time, the protection of a free individual has transformed in defense
of self-will, until it harms other individuals.” In this case, in paragraph IV.7. states that
“outside of God there is only aman fallen, very far from the ideal of perfection practiced
by Christians, manifested in Christ.” According to paragraph XVI.3.:
“There is an aspiration to present the universal non-spiritual culture based
on the understanding of the freedom of a fallen man who does not limit
himself to anything, as the only possible option, as an absolute value and
measure of truth. This development of globalization bymany in the Christian
world is compared with the construction of the Tower of Babel.” (Basics of
Social Concept of the ROC, XVI.3.)
There is onemore appeal to the notion of ”fallen” and ”sin” in paragraph XVI.3.: “The
Church cannot positively perceive such a global order, in which the human personality
obscured by sin is placed in the center of everything.”
From these quotes we see that the appeal to sin is very well used in political lan-
guage. It should be noted that this appeal to sin is not just beautiful theological for-
mulas calling to reflect on high matter about being and human nature, it is political
consequences, in particular, that are used as a justification for the coercion machine.
The functioning of the state coercion apparatus is grounded not solely by the need to
establish order in society, but by the need to counteract sin.
According to the Basics of the Social Concept, “the answer to the earthly reality
distorted by sin, helped to avoid an even greater sin through opposing it by means
of secular power.” § III.3 of the ROC the Basics of the Social Concept stipulates that
«The church should not assume the functions belonging to the state: opposition to sin
through violence, the use of worldly powers, the assumption of the functions of state
power, involving coercion or restriction.” Simultaneously, it is said that “the Church can
appeal to state authorities with a request or an appeal to resort to power in certain
cases”” (§ III.3). It is interesting, in itself that the function of the state was articulated
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as “confronting sin through coercion”, as well as the fact that the Church can initiate
opposition to sin by using a coercive machine, directing the state apparatus in one
direction or another. That is, the state retains a function of a kind of “policeman”, which
will help her maintain a moral and moral lifestyle in society.
The most radical example of practical application of such a stance is the words of
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin he said during a talk show with the eloquent title “Chil-
dren in Sin”, where the priest, then chairman of the Synodal Department of the Rus-
sian Orthodox Church for Relations between Church and Society, stated that ”morality
should be forced on precisely because man is not good as is, his nature is distorted
by sin [4]”. The priest stressed that ”as such, man will not come to morality,” which
means “he must be educated, including with harsh methods. (ibid)”
Appeal to sin, of course, is used to justify the right to participate in wars, and even
can meet when justifying the need for the existence of nuclear weapons. For example,
during a speech at the Nagorny Palace of Sports in 2009 in Nizhny Novgorod, Patriarch
Kirill noted that “as long as sin exists, it is impossible to abandon nuclear weapons,
since it is possible to completely abandon such sinful phenomena as war and foreign
policy confrontation only when sin no longer exists. [18]”
Thus, an appeal to sinfulness is used to promote the arms race, which is little
correlated with the ethical principles of Orthodoxy, as they reached us before the
revolution and before the creation of nuclear weapons [21]. That is, there was literally
an inversion. In the very beginning of the 90s, the church environment often cited
as performatives the words by St Seraphim of Sarov: “Acquire the spirit of peace and
thousands around you will be saved”, which contained a frank ecclesiastical message
urging a person to pacify, search for conflict resolution and conflict-free existence.
The irony of fate is that same St. Seraphim of Sarov was recognized as a mystical
harbinger and defender of nuclear weapons, since the words in the Akathist to St.
Seraphim “you are our shield and defense” were interpreted in a nuclear-strategic
way: it was suggested that the word “shield” should mean a “nuclear shield”, and
not anything else [22]. Orthodox publicist Yegor Kholmogorov and pro-Orthodox
nationalist Maxim Kalashnikov have even developed the doctrine of “atomic Ortho-
doxy”, where “Orthodoxy” and “nuclear bomb”” are presented in one bundle, as two
conjugated “allies of Russia” [7] – in the pendant formula of Alexander III, who said
that Russia has only two allies - the army and navy. There is also a rephrase of this
formula, which belongs to Kirill Frolov: ”Russia has three allies - the army, the navy
and the Church. [5]”
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7. Appeal to the Victim Image
Church speakers are constantly reminding in their public statements of the persecution
the Church had to endure during the twentieth century in the Soviet period. There are
real grounds for this, since the religious denominations were very much affected by
the actual persecution of religion, and at the beginning of the Soviet period, even to
a particular extent, the Orthodox Church was subjected to attacks while different reli-
gious movements and other faith persecuted before the revolution by the authorities
began to enjoy freedom and sometimes certain benefits. The discourse of victimhood,
a permanent appeal to the image of the victim was used very actively in the 1990s, a
logical reaction to the first opportunity to speak of persecutions that were not previ-
ously mentioned in Russia, but this discourse was not subsiding, but on the contrary, it
increased in the 2000-ties, and it continues to do so, even though there is no stigma,
and the Church enjoys many privileges. The discourse of victimhood phenomenon
became a phenomenon that had been existence.
An example of this is the speech of Patriarch Kirill he delivered during his visit to
Kazan. On July 21, 2016, when laying the capsule in the foundation of the restored
church of the Icon of the Mother of God of Kazan, the Patriarch said the following
words:
But the ruins we have here in the center of Kazan, these ruins emerged not because
the foreign invaders came to Kazan, but because we destroyed this beauty with our
own hands. Now, let’s ask the question: How has it come that the Orthodox people, the
Muslim believers, have allowed them to destroy temples and mosques in the country?
Because they got them persuaded that if you do this, you’ll be happy. And if you
have something wrong in your life, this is because an old, anachronistic worldview
encumbers you [1].
That is, by laying the stone, the Patriarch tries to remind of the persecutions the
Church endured during the Soviet period. But he implicitly ingrains another thought.
In order to be immune from mistakes similar to which we have witnessed,
looking at these ruins, wemust promise ourselves to never again be seduced
by any insane ideas that require the abandonment of faith, history, and
culture.” It is not easy now because we all live in a globalizing space (ibid).
That is, appealing to what has been done in the context of the persecution of the
twentieth century, the Patriarch does not simply draw a conclusion that there is no
need to destroy temples, but that different recipes for social modernization, social and
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political change must be taken with distrust and rejected given the tragic experience
of the collapse of the socio-political system in the Soviet period.
8. “Orthodox Holocaust” with a Sign “Plus”.
“Heroic Victim” Type
If we compare the appeal to the image of the victim in the Russian Churchwith a similar
discourse connected with the suffering of Jews during the Holocaust, we can use a
toolkit suggested by Korotetskaya, which identifies a heroic victim – a sacrifice and a
victimized person – a victim. According to the researcher, “if the sacrifice with inherent
proactivity automatically gains recognition within the society, a victim is passive, and
therefore innocent by definition, needs to confirm its sacrificial status: a process that
requires time, cultural processing in society and political will. ([17], p. 109-110)”
The appeal to the victim, which we see in the church discourse, corresponds exactly
to the first type: deprivation and humiliation since the persecution of the twentieth
century are mentioned not so much to cause compassion for the church as a sacrifice,
but for some self-affirmation, justification of rightness, preferential position in the
face other social forces that have not undergone such a strong test of strength. The
emphasis is placed on heroic overcoming, and this overcoming is articulated with the
simultaneous triumphalist message.
As part of this “heroic” attitude, during the post-Soviet period, the Church gradually
realizes its power role, the importance of its own re-rating in the eyes of society and
state structures through appeal to power institutions. The Church does not mind gain-
ing respect for herself through the government institutions of coercion (and sometimes
not only the government ones).
For example, claiming the right to call on the state to punish the participants of Pussy
Riot, one church speaker came up with an argument:
“The church should not bear any grudge at all (reaction to Pussy Riot - note).
But here it is very important that some actions of the Church cannot be
taken as a proof that this kind of behavior is ever possible... Many had an
impression that it was a test of the fight. About us they say “quilted jackets”,
“non-passionate people”; “And who are the Orthodox? They are grannies,
they are not be reckoned with.”… Until recently, such a stance was very
common - they say, the Orthodox are not a very important factor, everyone
will tolerate... And suddenly such a reaction! [11]”
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“Therefore, I assure you, there was no malice in our hearts, but to do so (to
forgive Pussy Riot – ed.) - meant to make a significant mistake, to convey a
wrong message to our society, our people. We could not go this far. (ibid)”
9. Conclusion
Our reflections can be summarized by that the political language of the Church is an
abundant area for research, an interesting phenomenon from the culturological point
of view. Here, the contradictory paradoxes of the presence of religion in politics, as
well as the post-secular processes as a whole are clearly revealed.
The gospel, the principles of asceticism are the values that overbear politics in the
ecclesiastical consciousness, however, the imperative of influencing society urges us
to develop in one way or another the political mechanisms for incorporating these
values into the society, which often leads to their distortion and, of course, the depar-
ture from the gospel simplicity. The more Orthodoxy in Russia is institutionalized, the
more developed and complex the political language of the Church becomes. The Church
demonstrates itself as an independent and substantial political force. In addition, it is
clear that it seeks to include in the arsenal of its appeals to society different patterns,
belief patterns, apologetic discourses that pay due regard to the tragic experience of
the twentieth century. It applies the tools used by various political forces to overcome
discriminatory situations, to raise authority or simply to exit from an underreported
position in the social system. It is also obvious that the Church enjoys the legal rhetoric
of the institution protecting human rights, developed in the West, but at the same
time it fundamentally discards the Western values as they are, trying to direct these
institutions to defend their own mindset, their traditionalist principles and even to
oppose the West itself.
That is, we see the endorsement of the phenomenon, which Ronald Dor described
as “the second indigenization.” This is the stage of indigenization, when after a cer-
tain initial revival of the national culture and, including the religion traditional for this
culture, the driving forces of this national cultural revival begin the process of encap-
sulation and isolation from Western values. Continuing to use the technical, social
and economic tools developed in the West, the agents of national revitalization and
revivalism initiate the process of isolation from the West, labelling Western liberalism
and ideology with the term of “westoxification”. We see, one way or another, that as
long as the ecclesial life in the post-Soviet period was restored, the political language
of the Church evolved from a certain stigmatization to the triumphalist discourse aimed
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i7.2488 Page 379
ISPS Convention 2017
not so much at protecting the institution of the Church as at reinforcing its influence on
society. Accordingly, the usual liberal human rights mechanisms are being replaced by
new ones aimed not to “protect” the Church as a minority, but to assert the Church’s
ideological principles at the level of the country and society.
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